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NEW MEXICO’S INDEPENDENT ETHICS
COMMISSION AND THE LONG FIGHT TO
CONSTRAIN PUBLIC CORRUPTION
Lane Towery

ABSTRACT
After a string of high-profile corruption scandals1 in state
government, and a decade-long legislative fight to find a solution,
in 2018 New Mexico voters passed a popular constitutional
amendment creating an independent ethics commission.2 Enabling
legislation cleared the legislature during the 2019 session3, and
the commission began operating on January 1, 2020. The ethics
commission hears complaints made against candidates, lobbyists,
and public officials in the executive and legislative branches. In
addition, it publishes opinions on questions of ethics in state
government. The commission, however, risks failing at its mission
to reduce unethical behavior because of a lack of power and gaps
in underlying anti-corruption law.
Part I of this comment explores the cyclical history of corruption
and attempts to pass anti-corruption law in New Mexico. It then
explains the legislative history behind the new ethics commission,
including the constitutional amendment and enabling legislation.
Part II examines the strengths and critiques the flaws of the ethics
commission. This comment notes that by passing a constitutional
amendment, New Mexico avoided separation of powers concerns

1. E.g., Andy Barr, Bill Richardson Tarnished by Scandal, POLITICO (Feb. 12, 2009, 4:50 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2009/02/bill-richardson-tarnished-by-scandal-018741
[https://perma.cc/HP29-L7DD]; Dan Boyd, Duran Sentenced to 30 Days in Jail, Ordered to Pay $28,000,
ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL (Dec. 14, 2015, 10:26 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/691066/duransentenced-to-30-days-in-jail-she-may-kill-plea-deal.html [https://perma.cc/RD7B-JRRQ] (last updated
Dec. 15, 2015, 11:12 PM); Morgan Lee, Ex-New Mexico State Senator is Convicted in Corruption Trial,
CRUCES
SUN
NEWS
(Nov.
16,
2017,
7:54
PM),
https://www.lcsunLAS
news.com/story/news/local/2017/11/16/ex-new-mexico-state-senator-convicted-corruptiontrial/873187001/ [https://perma.cc/8Z7C-3NTW] (last updated Nov. 16, 2017, 8:26 P.M.).
2. 2017 N.M. Laws, Constitutional Amendment 2 at 1640; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 17.
3. See Ethics Commission Act, S.B. 668, 2019 N.M. Laws, ch. 86, §§ 1–33 (codified in scattered
sections of N.M. STAT. ANN.).
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that can undermine statutorily created commissions.4 On the other
hand, the analysis notes gaps that will potentially frustrate the
effectiveness of the commission: limited jurisdiction, lack of
subpoena power, and an absence of recurring funding.5 In making
these critiques, this comment makes recommendations for
strengthening the commission, often looking to other states for
examples.
Part III argues that an ethics commission is insufficient to address
public corruption by itself without a broad set of laws and norms
addressing corruption’s root causes.6 It also makes
recommendations for filling gaps in substantive anti-corruption
law. While the ethics commission can bring some accountability to
bad actors and transparency to bad behavior, other features of
state government leave incentives for corruption: a lack of pay for
legislators, little conflict of interest enforcement for legislators,
opaque capital outlay procedures, and feeble asset disclosure laws
for public officials, for example.7 In such an environment, even a
strong ethics commission will struggle to address public
corruption. A weak one risks being a salve-turned-irritant,
disappointing a citizenry that voted strongly in favor of fighting
unethical behavior by its public leaders.
INTRODUCTION
On the final day of the 2014 legislative session, New Mexico state Senator
Phil Griego cast what seemed like a simple vote to approve the sale of state land.8
Senator Griego held a real estate license himself and was familiar with the historic
Santa Fe building which was the subject of the sale.9 Just a month after making his
vote, he brokered the deal to sell the state property to a friend, earning a $51,389.07
commission in the process.10 This was, of course, illegal. The New Mexico
4. See Erin McSherry, The Proposed State Ethics Commission Act: Reform for New Mexico’s Wild
West Politics, or Simply a Mirage, 39 N.M. L. REV. 597, 618–627 (2009) (analyzing constitutional
separation of powers problems with a statutory ethics commission).
5. Essential Elements for an Independent Ethics Commission, N. M. ETHICS WATCH,
http://nmethicswatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/NMEW-ESSENTIAL-ELEMENTS-FOR-ANINDEPENDENT-ETHICS-COMMISSION.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VEE-XD4A]).
6. Kayla Crider and Jeffrey Milyo, Do State Ethics Commissions Reduce Political Corruption?: An
Exploratory Investigation, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 717 (2013) (discussing the limited evidence of the
efficacy of state ethics commissions).
7. See Gwyneth Doland, New Mexico Gets D- Grade In 2015 State Integrity Investigation, CTR.
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 9, 2016), https://publicintegrity.org/state-politics/state-integrityinvestigation/new-mexico-gets-d-grade-in-2015-state-integrity-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/FG5KJMKN] (last updated Nov. 12, 2015, 12:02 PM).
8. Peter
St.
Cyr,
Sold
Out,
SANTA
FE
REPORTER
(July
22,
2014),
https://www.sfreporter.com/news/coverstories/2014/07/22/sold-out/ [https://perma.cc/K77V-37CF].
9. Id.
10. Id.; Matt Grubbs, Griego Guilty, SANTA FE REPORTER (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.sfreporter.com/news/2017/11/16/griego-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/6ACE-APVK]
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Constitution prohibits elected officials from benefiting from any contract with the
state, let alone one the official cast a vote to approve.11
Griego was eventually found guilty of fraud, bribery, violating the ethical
principle of public service and having an unlawful interest in a public contract.12 For
these crimes, a judge sentenced him to eighteen months in prison and fined him
$47,225—still less than he pocketed in the real estate deal.13 At sentencing, Second
District Court Judge Brett Loveless said that none of the jurors from the pool selected
for trial had a positive view of the public officials representing them.14 “That
perception is the danger here. . . . It’s the danger that when people don’t have
confidence in their elected officials, they’re disenfranchised,” the Judge said.15
Griego was no aberration. His trial followed on the heels of former
Secretary of State Diana Duran’s resignation and plea deal for drawing off campaign
funds to spend at casinos.16 Duran, in turn, won her campaign against previous
Secretary of State Mary Herrera, who was mired in corruption charges of her own
for allegedly forcing her staff to work on her campaign.17 All of this was famously
preceded by former Governor Bill Richardson losing out on a cabinet position in the
Obama administration for an alleged pay-to-play scheme.18 These are but some of
many examples of public misconduct, both recent and old, which give New Mexico
a reputation for corruption. 19
The data confirms the reputation. Whether measured by number of
convictions, by public perception, by news stories, or by strength of state laws, New
Mexico often compares badly on state-by-state measures of corruption. A 2014 study
by Harvard’s Center for Ethics, for example, found that New Mexico ranks in the
top quartile of “most corrupt” states according to public perception.20 In a 2014
article based in part on news reports about corruption, New Mexico was ranked the

11. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 28.
12. Grubbs, supra note 10.
13. Matt Grubbs, Prison Time for Phil, SANTA FE REPORTER (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://www.sfreporter.com/news/2018/02/16/prison-time-for-phil/ [https://perma.cc/9DA6-Q6FP].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Morgan Lee, Duran Reports to Jail for Embezzlement Term, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Dec. 18, 2015,
10:15 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/693244/the-latest-disgraced-new-mexico-official-checks-intojail.html [https://perma.cc/AQ4N-UDNX] (last updated Dec. 18, 2015, 12:12 PM).
17. Phaedra Haywood, Court’s Decision Will Allow Suits Against Mary Herrera to Proceed, SANTA
FE NEW MEXICAN (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/court-sdecision-will-allow-suits-against-mary-herrera-to/article_4658b337-9659-5716-957b-a3b56f380362
.html [https://perma.cc/8TBL-9L2G] (last updated Apr. 9, 2015).
18. Barr, supra note 1.
19. For a succinct comparison of different measures of state corruption, including New Mexico’s low
ranking on public perception of corruption, see Harry Enten, Ranking the States from Most to Least
Corrupt, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 23, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/ranking-thestates-from-most-to-least-corrupt/ [https://perma.cc/72YC-FXF6].
20. Oguzhan Dincer & Michael Johnston, Measuring Illegal and Legal Corruption in American
States: Some Results from the Corruption in America Survey, EDMUND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS: BLOG
(Dec. 1, 2014), https://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/measuring-illegal-and-legal-corruption-american-statessome-results-safra [https://perma.cc/8GEL-VYVA].
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fifth most corrupt state in America.21 The Center for Public Integrity, in a 2015
report, gave New Mexico a D-minus grade for state government accountability and
transparency.22
As the drip of state corruption scandals and bad rankings grew ever steadier,
the legislature stepped into the breach. During the 2017 legislative session,
lawmakers of both parties passed a constitutional amendment to create an
independent State Ethics Commission (hereafter “Ethics Commission” or
“Commission”).23 Voters overwhelmingly approved the amendment seventy-five
percent to twenty-five percent.24 New Mexico was one of only six states without an
independent ethics commission at the time.25 In 2019, lawmakers passed enabling
legislation formalizing the Ethics Commission, thus concluding a decade-long effort
to create the new body.26
The effort to reduce corruption, however, is not over. The State Ethics
Commission is designed with endemic weaknesses and risks disappointing its many
supporters. Additionally, ethics commissions—even strong ones—are insufficient to
address public corruption writ large.27 Research suggests that state ethics
commissions are not correlated with reduced rates of public corruption in states that
have implemented them.28 The research should be seen as a warning, but it is hardly
final. Measuring corruption is quite difficult. In the cited research, for example,
corruption was measured using criminal convictions in a particular state—a
convenient metric but an attenuated proxy for all public corruption.
This Comment assumes that the Ethics Commission can and should be an
effective deterrent to corrupt behavior even if implementation is challenging.29 To
21. See Oguzhan C. Dincer & Michael Johnston, Corruption Issues in State and Local Politics: Is
Political Culture a Deep Determinant?, EDMOND J. SAFRA WORKING PAPERS, NO. 48, (September 10,
2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2491226 [https://perma.cc/58L8-4KUH ].
22. Doland, supra note 7.
23. 2017 N.M. Laws, Constitutional Amendment 2 at 1640; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 17.
24. OFFICIAL RESULTS 2018 GENERAL – November 6, 2018, N. M. SEC’Y ST. (Nov. 25, 2018,
6:38
PM),
http://electionresults.sos.state.nm.us/resultsSW.aspx?eid=2698&type=SW&map=CTY
[https://perma.cc/Q95V-H7KR]
25. Dan McKay, Independent Ethics Commission, Bond Proposals Win Approval, ALBUQUERQUE J.
(Nov. 6, 2018, 5:53 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1242788/voters-weigh-ethics-commission-statebonds.html [https://perma.cc/WR4R-YQL8].
26. State Ethics Commission Act, 2019 N.M. Laws, ch. 86, §§ 1–33 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10-16G-1 to -16 and in other scattered sections of N.M. STAT. ANN.).
27. Crider & Milyo, supra note 6, at 732.
28. Id.
29. Two very recent court decisions make the State Ethics Commission a critical enforcer of state
anti-corruption law. First, in Kelly v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted the Federal
Government’s ability to prosecute the behavior of local officials. No. 18-1059, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 2640
140 S. Ct. 1565, 1574 (2020) (“Federal prosecutors may not use property fraud statutes to ‘set[] standards
of disclosure and good government for local and state officials.’ . . . In effect, the Federal Government
could use the criminal law to enforce (its view of) integrity in broad swaths of state and local
policymaking.” (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987)). Shortly thereafter, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that a section of the Governmental Conduct Act was not impermissively
vague, giving the Ethics Commission and state prosecutors critical power to investigate and prosecute
behavior which pursues personal benefit or private interests. State v. Gutierrez, 2020-NMCA-045, ¶¶ 34,
36 cert. granted (Sept. 8, 2020).
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ensure the Commission’s success and to meet the goal of reduced corruption, the
legislature must act in two ways. First, the Commission must be given greater power.
And, second, New Mexico should look beyond the Ethics Commission to address
gaps in its substantive anti-corruption law regime.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the waves of
corruption and halting efforts at anti-corruption in New Mexico. It also explains the
constitutional amendment and enabling legislation. New Mexico avoided
constitutional separation of powers problems that can plague statutorily created
ethics commissions by going the route of constitutional amendment.30 But the
enabling legislation, a last-minute bill born of political compromise, is not without
potential pitfalls.
In Part II, this Comment argues that the legislature must strengthen the
Commission if it is to meet its mandate. Specifically, Part II interrogates the
legislation for potential weaknesses related to jurisdiction, subpoena power, funding,
and political appointments while acknowledging strengths in the commission’s legal
foundation and transparency.
Finally, Part III argues for strengthening substantive anti-corruption laws in
New Mexico. Independent ethics commissions are a popular response to public
corruption, though they are best understood as one piece of a complex puzzle which
should also include addressing a lack of pay for legislators, feeble asset disclosure
laws for public officials, and opaque capital outlay procedures.
BACKGROUND
I.
A.

PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND NEW MEXICO’S LONG EFFORT
TO CONTAIN IT
Corruption Defined

The narrow definition of corruption, used in U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence, is quid pro quo—money in exchange for political favors.31 The
narrow definition makes identifying corruption easy, but quid pro quo is not the only
way positions of public trust are used corruptly. A slightly broader definition is
“using public life for private gain.”32 The broadest definition of corruption is any act
that deviates from the public interest:
Institutional corruption is manifest when there is a systemic and
strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, that
undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its
purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including,

30. See, e.g. McSherry, supra note 4, at 602 (discussing a failed bill to create a statutory ethics
commission in 2007).
31. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976).
32. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 374 (2009) (arguing
that the framers thought of public corruption not as explicit quid pro quo, but in moral terms, as a “rotting
of positive ideals of civic virtue and public integrity” and “conscious or reckless abuse of the position of
trust.”).
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to the extent relevant to its purpose, weakening either the public’s
trust in that institution or the institution’s inherent
trustworthiness.33
This definition acknowledges that corruption comes in two flavors—illegal
and legal. While both types can have a pernicious effect, the distinction is important
and helpful.
Illegal corruption can be understood as “crimes by public officials for
personal gain.”34 This is the type of corruption like that described in the
introduction—a governor’s pay-to-play scheme or a state senator’s vote cast for a
government contract benefiting himself individually, for example.35 Legal
corruption, on the other hand, can be defined as serving private ends from a position
of public trust in ways that laws have not criminalized. New Mexico’s “citizen
legislature,” in which legislators work only part-time and maintain regular jobs, is
fertile ground for the growth of legal forms of corruption. Senator Phil Griego, who
suffered criminal consequences for the illegal corruption already described, voted
for years for bills removing title insurance companies’ liability while working in the
title insurance business—all legally.36 An opaque capital outlay process also
provides opportunity for legislators to direct state money to themselves, their family,
or their employers.37 Both legal and illegal forms of corruption redirect public
institutions from their work to serve the public, and for that reason this Comment
addresses not only that corruption which is explicitly prohibited in law, but also the
spaces in our regulatory regime where corruption can flourish legally.
B.

Anti-Corruption and the New Mexico Constitution

At its founding, New Mexico included certain anti-corruption measures in
its constitution. Members of the legislature who accept or solicit bribes of any kind
in return for their vote or influence on any legislation are guilty of a felony.38 No
member of the legislature can benefit from a government contract.39 Officers of the
executive branch must report their income annually.40 Public officers profiting off of
public money or misusing public funds are guilty of a felony.41 In the important “antidonation” clause, state and local governments are barred from giving aid or donations
to individuals or private enterprises—in effect prohibiting nepotistic government
contracting.42 It is even a crime for legislators to accept railroad passes that are not

33. Lawrence Lessig, FOREWORD: “Institutional Corruption” Defined, 41 J. L., MED. & ETHICS,
553, 553 (2013).
34. Crider & Milyo, supra note 6, at 717.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 8–19.
36. For an extensive treatment of ethical dilemmas and legal forms of corruption in the New Mexico
Legislature, see DEDE FELDMAN, INSIDE THE NEW MEXICO SENATE 215–227 (2014).
37. See id. at 220.
38. N.M. CONST. art. IV, §§ 39–40.
39. Id. art. IV, § 28.
40. Id .art. V, § 9.
41. Id.. art. VIII, § 4.
42. Id. art. IX, § 14.
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also available to the general public.43 These constitutional measures, of course, belie
a history of government corruption.
C.

The Cycle of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in New Mexico History
1.

1960s and 1970s Reforms: Conflict of Interest Act, Open Meetings
Act, Lobbyist Regulation Act, Campaign Reporting Act.

The common anti-corruption measures instituted by states across the
country during the last half century have generally fallen into the categories of
freedom of information acts, campaign finance restrictions, lobbying regulations,
and independent ethics commissions.44 New Mexico has followed suit, though often
slowly, reluctantly, and in response to public scandals. The history of new laws
followed by yet more corruption scandals is a warning to those who place great faith
in new measures.
In 1967 the New Mexico Legislature first took aim at corruption broadly by
passing the Conflict of Interest Act.45 The act addressed forms of quid pro quo and
self-enrichment in government by prohibiting state employees and legislators from
accepting any gift that “tends to influence him in the discharge of his official acts.”46
It required public officials to disqualify themselves from official acts which would
have a personal financial benefit.47 The act also took aim at how government
contracts were awarded, restricting state agencies from entering into contracts with
a state employee or a legislator or their businesses unless the personal interest was
disclosed and a competitive bidding process was used.48 The law curtailed
government’s ability to award contracts to entities represented by former public
officials.49 State employees and legislators were required to make annual disclosures
to the Secretary of State regarding personal business interests affected by
government acts.50 Additionally, the new law required every executive agency to
create codes of conduct.51
The Conflict of Interest Act allowed for only civil enforcement and could
include dismissal, demotion, or suspension.52 The procedure for reaching any
enforcement outcome, however, was cumbersome: a group of at least 20 legislators,
with no less than eight from each major party, had standing in court to bring a civil

43. Id. art. IV, § 37; see also N.M. Att’y Gen. Op. 33-603 (1933) (writing that the purpose of this
restriction was to “eliminat[e] graft upon the part of members of the legislature and to relieve said
members of any feeling of obligation toward a railroad company by virtue of possession of a free pass.”)
44. See, e.g., Crider & Milyo, supra note 6, at 718.
45. See Conflict of Interest Act, 1967 N.M. Laws, ch. 306, §§1–17 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §
5-12-1 (1953)).
46. Id. § 3.
47. Id. § 4.
48. Id. §§ 7,9.
49. Id. § 8.
50. Id. § 10.
51. Id. § 11.
52. Id. § 14
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enforcement action.53 If the subject was a legislator removable only by impeachment,
the House of Representatives would have to take up the matter internally.54
In 1974, the legislature passed the Open Meetings Act, requiring adequate
notice of and access to meetings of public bodies in New Mexico—essentially ending
secret meetings.55 The Lobbyist Regulation Act passed in 1977 to bring some
transparency and order to legislative lobbying.56 The Campaign Reporting Act
passed shortly after in 1979.57 The law regulates campaign committees and political
action committees and requires reporting of both campaign spending and
independent expenditures.58 Thus, by 1979, New Mexico had a foundation of anticorruption law on which to stand.
2.

The 1990s Reform Effort: The Financial Disclosures Act, Inspection
of Public Records Act, Governmental Conduct Act, and Legislative
Ethics Committee

There was little advance in anti-corruption until a new scandal shook the
legislature in 1992. That year, Representative Ron Olguin, a Democrat from
Albuquerque, was found to have accepted $15,000 in exchange for his help obtaining
state funding for a community corrections program.59 The entire House of
Representatives gathered to expel him from its body, the exact solution contemplated
in the Conflict of Interest Act.60 But the House balked, merely censuring Olguin and
allowing him to keep his seat and committee assignments.61 He was later tried
criminally, but the legislature itself never took action against him.62 Gallup
Representative Dominic Ferrari was caught saying, “I’m concerned that if all were
known about everybody, we may be in that same chair.”63 In response to the public
outrage about its inaction, the legislature created a taskforce to address ethics.64
From the 1993 taskforce came many recommendations and a few reforms.
The legislature passed the Financial Disclosures Act during the 1993 session to
clarify public officials’ annual income reporting requirements.65 The act, however,
has often been criticized for its gaps by open government proponents.66 The
53. Id. § 15.
54. Id. § 14.
55. 1974 N.M. Laws, ch. 91, §§ 1–7 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-6-23 (1953)).
56. 1977 N.M. Laws, ch. 261, § 1 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 2-13-1 (1953)).
57. 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 360, § 1 (current version at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19-25 to 36 (1978)).
58. Id.
59. See FELDMAN, supra note 36, at217
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 218.
64. Id.
65. 1993 N.M. Laws ch. 46, §§ 39–45 (current version at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-16A-1 to 8 (1978)
(requiring legislators to annually report their and their spouse’s income over $5000, and making violation
a misdemeanor).
66. See, e.g. infra Part III, Section B; KATHLEEN SABO & TERI AREVALO, N.M. ETHICS WATCH,
THIRD TIME NO CHARM, http://nmethicswatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/NMEW_FDA-Followup-Report3.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE38-ZC54].
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legislature strengthened the Campaign Reporting Act,67 and passed a new Inspection
of Public Records Act, making the rights and procedures related to public records
requests clearer.68
The legislature’s biggest action was in strengthening the Conflict of Interest
Act, renaming it the Governmental Conduct Act.69 The amendment upgraded explicit
quid pro quo from a civil offense to a fourth degree felony in state law.70 The
amendment also prohibited honoraria collected for speeches made in an official
capacity.71 It required that, in addition to each executive department, the legislative
council adopt a code of conduct for legislators.72 The complaint process was
clarified, directing complaints against executive branch employees to be submitted
to agency heads, complaints against legislative branch employees to be submitted to
the legislative council, and complaints against judicial branch employees to follow
the judicial personnel rules.73
Finally, the amendment streamlined enforcement. The new law directed the
Attorney General to enforce the act, including by civil injunctive or other appropriate
orders—significantly simplifying the no longer operative rule which gave standing
only to 20 legislators acting together.74 The Legislative Ethics Committee was
created to address ethics violations committed by legislators, however, as of 2014, it
had never taken an action against a legislator.75
3.

2000s Era Reform Effort: The Gift Act and Amendments to Other
Acts Regulating Corruption

Little more than a decade later, New Mexico was again hit by a corruption
scandal when two consecutive state treasurers, Robert Vigil and Michael Montoya,
were indicted in a new pay-to-play scheme and charged with extortion and
racketeering for directing state business to certain brokers in return for millions of
dollars in kickbacks.76 Once again, in response, a task force was created. And again,

67. 1995 N.M. Laws, ch. 153, §§ 12, 19 (current version at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19-34.1, 34.6
(1978)) (prohibiting legislators from soliciting contributions during the legislative session and providing
for civil penalties).
68. See 1993 N.M. Laws, ch. 260, §§ 1–5 (current version at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-1 to 12
(1978)).
69. Id., ch. 46, §§ 26–38 (current version at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-16-1 to 18 (1978)).
70. Id., § 28 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-3(D) (1978)).
71. Id., § 38 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-4.1 (1978)).
72. Id.§ 34 (codified with some differences in language at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-11 (1978)).
73. Id., § 36 (codified with some differences in language at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-14 (1978)).
74. Id.
75. See FELDMAN, supra note 36, at218–219.
76. See, e.g.id. at 222; see also New Mexico Treasurer, Ex-Treasurer Arrested, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
(Sept. 17, 2005) http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9373061/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/new-mexicotreasurer-ex-treasurer-arrested/ [https://perma.cc/SNA4-2X7G]; Felicia Fonseca, Treasurer Michael
ALBUQUERQUE
J.
(Sept.
26,
2007)
Montoya
Sentenced
to
40
Months,
https://www.abqjournal.com/news/apmichael09-26-07.htm [https://perma.cc/9DWV-7NBR]; Daniel J.
Chacon, Steve Terrell & Staci Matlock, New Mexico Is No Stranger to Crimes Committed by Officials,
but is it Worse Here Than in Other States?, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Dec. 27, 2015)
https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/new-mexico-is-no-stranger-to-crimescommitted-by-officials/article13bd63e8-1284-5b37-9cd1-f760c337718f.html [https://perma.cc/92BG-
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legislative pushback led to the failure of many recommendations, but the Gift Act
was passed in 2007 and the Governmental Conduct Act and Campaign Reporting
Act were strengthened yet again.77 Amendments to the Governmental Conduct Act
required disclosure by public officials of any employment entered into outside of the
official’s public job.78 It also prohibited government employees participating in the
contracting process from becoming employed by the business contracting with the
government.79 The amendments extended the restrictions on how government
contracts are awarded, adding family members of state employees and legislators to
the constraints, and expanding the law to cover local government contracts in
addition to the state level.80
D.

The Long Road to an Independent Ethics Commission

Legislation for an independent ethics commission made its first appearance
in 2007.81 The commission failed in Senate committees then, as it continued to do
for a decade.82 In the five years from 2007 to 2012, forty-nine bills creating an ethics
commission were introduced in the legislature—and each of them died.83
While the proposed ethics commission stalled in the Senate, the Senate
President Pro Tempore pled guilty to attempting to defraud the state of $4.4 million
in 2009.84 The plot involved the Senate leader directing extra capital outlay funding
to the construction of the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Courthouse—funds which
eventually found their way back to his pockets.85 The same year, Governor
Richardson was caught up in an FBI investigation into his alleged pay-to-play
scheme.86 As a bookend, in 2015 Secretary of State Diana Duran went to jail for
embezzling state funds.87
In 2017 the legislature changed course to the harder path of introducing the
ethics commission as a constitutional amendment, which finally passed both

2YYK] (quoting from an FBI affidavit in which Secretary Montoya told one investment advisor, “that’s
the way we do business in New Mexico.”).
77. Gift Act, 2007 N.M. Laws, ch. 226, §§ 1–4; Governmental Conduct Act, 2007 N.M. Laws, ch.
362, §§ 1–12; Governmental Conduct Act, 2011 N.M. Laws, ch. 138, §§ 1–15; Campaign Reporting Act,
2009 N.M. Laws, ch. 68, §§ 1–6; Campaign Reporting Act, 2009 N.M. Laws, ch. 67, §§ 1–7.
78. 2007 N.M. Laws, ch. 362, § 10 (codified with some differences in language at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-16-4.2 (1978)).
79. 2011 N.M. Laws, ch. 138, § 1.
80. See 2007 N.M. Laws, ch. 362, § 5; see also 2011 N.M. Laws, ch. 138, § 3 (current version at
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-7 (1978)).
81. See
H.B.
822,
48th
Leg.,
1st
Sess.
(N.M.
2007),
https://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/07%20Regular/bills/house/HB0822.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5SB-FJAE].
LEGISLATURE,
82. 2007
Regular
Session
–
HB
822,
N.M.
https://nmlegis.gov/Legislation/Legislation?Chamber=H&LegType=B&LegNo=822&year=07
[https://perma.cc/LLC7-MZNP].
83. FELDMAN, supra note 36, at 224 .
84. Chacon, et al., supra note 78.
85. Id.
86. See Barr, supra note 1.
87. See Boyd, supra note 1.
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houses.88 This route is more complicated than a statute because a constitutional
amendment must be voted on by the public.89 New Mexicans spoke loudly,
approving the Ethics Commission seventy-five percent to twenty-five percent on the
2018 general election ballot.90 Now, not only was the commission enshrined in the
constitution, but the fifty-percentage-point margin put pressure on recalcitrant
legislators to finally empower an independent ethics agency.91
E.

The Constitutional Amendment

The language of the constitutional amendment created the Commission as
an “independent state agency,” and prescribed seven commissioners.92 The
amendment described in detail how the commissioners were to be selected—one
each by the governor, speaker of the house, house minority floor leader, senate pro
tempore, and minority floor leader of the senate with the legislatively selected
members choosing two more members from different political parties.93 As for
addressing the Commission’s actual work, the constitutional amendment empowered
the Commission to
initiate, receive, investigate and adjudicate complaints alleging
violations of, and issue advisory opinions concerning, standards of
ethical conduct and other standards of conduct and reporting
requirements, as may be provided by law, for state officers and
employees of the executive and legislative branches of
government, candidates or other participants in elections, lobbyists
or government contractors or seekers of government contracts and
have such other jurisdiction as provided by law.94
Additionally, the constitution allows the Commission to require the
attendance of witnesses and production of evidence by subpoena “as provided by
law” and gives the legislature leeway to further empower the Commission.95 The
legislature, then, still had an integral role to play in defining the powers, procedures,
and funding of the Commission.
F.

The Enabling Legislation

The terms of the enabling legislation were heavily disputed and
demonstrated the legislature’s fear of the new Ethics Commission. The House and

88. 2017 N.M. Laws, Constitutional Amendment 2 at 1640.
89. See N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 1.
90. OFFICIAL RESULTS 2018 GENERAL – November 6, 2018, supra note 24.
91. Interview with Daymon Ely, District 23 Representative, New Mexico House of Representatives,
in Albuquerque, N.M. (Oct. 23, 2019) (“The voters had overwhelmingly approved the constitutional
amendment so there was real pressure on the legislature to get this passed.”).
92. N.M. CONST., art. V, § 17.
93. Id.
94. Id., § 17(B).
95. Id., § 17(C).
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Senate introduced bills which would create starkly different Commissions.96 At
issue, in particular, were the subpoena power, the blackout period, transparency, and
burdens of proof.97 Additionally, the Senate version provided stiff penalties for
anyone—including the complainant—found leaking confidential information,
making such disclosure a misdemeanor punishable by a $10,000 fine and a year in
prison.98 The Senate bill manifested the political threat legislators felt from the
Commission. Legislators feared that the Commission could be used for nefarious
purposes by political enemies bringing unsubstantiated complaints to tarnish a public
career or interfere with an election.99 Legislators also worried, perhaps correctly, that
even bogus complaints would require hiring a lawyer at the personal expense of the
unpaid law makers.100
The House of Representatives passed its version easily, setting up a
showdown in the Senate Rules Committee where the chair, Senator Linda Lopez,
was the sponsor of the Senate’s own distinct version of the Ethics Commission bill.101
Representative Daymon Ely, who sponsored the House bill, appeared before the
Senate Committee. Representative Ely struck a nerve by telling the committee that
it had a choice to choose a bill which “tramples on the first amendment” by
criminalizing leakers or one that does not, and both versions of the bill were tabled.102

96. Compare H.B. 4, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019), https://www.nmlegis.gov
/Sessions/19%20Regular/bills/house/HB0004.pdf [https://perma.cc/FFZ5-SDH4], with S.B. 619, 54th
Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019), https://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/19%20Regular/bills/senate/SB0619.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9M5G-7FQ2].
97. The House would enable the Commission with subpoena power while the Senate would not; the
House would prohibit complaints against candidates during a 45-day period before elections, the Senate
from primary dates until general elections; the House would allow more public access earlier, while the
Senate preferred greater secrecy; the House would require a preponderance of the evidence standard, the
Senate clear and convincing evidence. Compare N.M. H.B. 4, with N.M. S.B. 619,; see also interview
with Daymon Ely, supra note 92.
98. N.M. S.B. 619, § 16.
99. Interview with Daymon Ely, supra note 92 (“The way I think politicians view the ethics
commission—which I don’t think is illegitimate—is that it can be a tool for nefarious purposes, that people
can make last-minute complaints that are not substantiated and they’ll be used against them. That’s what
they’re worried about: everybody’s got to lawyer up, it’s a citizen legislature and we’re all going be
spending money on lawyers and you’re going to drive everyone away. All of those are legitimate
concerns.”).
100. Id.
101. 2019 Regular Session – HB 4, N.M. LEGISLATURE, https://www.nmlegis.gov
/Legislation/Legislation?chamber=H&legType=B&legNo=4&year=19 [https://perma.cc/A69L-PYNA]
(follow “Actions” link at left) (passing the House by a vote of 56 to 11).
102. Interview with Daymon Ely, supra note 92. (“I said, look you have choices between the House
and Senate version. Public has a choice. Senate Committee has a choice. You can either have a bill that
provides that the ethics commission is transparent or not. The House version is essentially transparent.
The Senate bill is not. You can have the House bill where the commission has direct subpoena power or
the Senate bill where they don’t. You can have a bill that tramples on the first amendment which is the
Senate version or one that doesn’t which is the House version. And then everyone went apeshit on me as
expected. So everybody got pissed and it just stopped everything but neither version was going to get out
anyway.”)
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The Senate then felt pressure to act for fear of seeming like it was the
chamber against the Ethics Commission.103 So Senator Mimi Stewart revived the
effort in the Senate Education Committee where she had already submitted a
“dummy bill”104 which she substituted to look more like the House version.105 A
manic amendment process followed, revealing the compromises necessary to pass
the bill. Some changes created higher bars to submitting complaints. A requirement
was added that complainants attest under oath subject to penalty of perjury when
submitting a complaint.106 A new clause required a vote by five commissioners to
instigate a complaint process.107 Other amendments restricted the scope of the
Commission’s authority. Public school districts and boards were removed from the
Commission’s jurisdiction.108 Similarly, an amendment removed the Open Meetings
Act, Inspection of Public Records Act, and the School District Campaign Reporting
Act from the Commission’s jurisdiction.109 Finally, the length of time from a finding
of probable cause until a complaint is made public was extended from twenty days
to thirty days.110
Senator Stewart’s bill passed both houses unanimously, although with some
remaining differences between the two chambers.111 In a midnight conference
committee meeting on the last day of the session, representatives from the House and
Senate compromised on both the subpoena power and blackout period, and a final
bill was agreed upon. 112 Governor Lujan Grisham later signed the State Ethics
Commission Act into law.113
The debates between chambers and each amendment to the final bill makes
clear that the legislative intent manifest in the final State Ethics Commission Act was
not to create the strongest or most independent commission possible. Instead, the
powers of the commission were negotiated against the desire to protect legislators’
careers and pocketbooks from frivolous complaints, resulting in a compromise law
which chipped away at the Commission’s power in impactful ways.
103. Id. (“Now there is pressure on the Senate . . . the Senate has a political problem, they look
terrible.”).
104. A dummy bill refers to a procedural maneuver in which a legislator submits a blank bill at the
beginning of the session and, after the deadline for filing new bills has passed, brings the blank bill up for
consideration in committee with an amendment constituting the entire text of a new substitute bill. See
Andy Lyman, ‘Dummy Bills’ Can Create New, Resurrect Old Bills, N.M. POL. REP. (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://nmpoliticalreport.com/2016/02/04/dummy-bills-can-create-new-resurrect-old-bills-nmleg/
[https://perma.cc/9MLP-492K].
105. See
S.B.
668,
54th
Leg.,
1st
Sess.
(N.M.
2019),
https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/19%20Regular/bills/senate/SB0668EDS.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9FRPKCU].
106. Id. (providing in-line, text-specific changes to the bill per each amendment),
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
LEGISLATURE
111. See
2019
Regular
Session
–
SB
668,
N.M.
https://www.nmlegis.gov/Legislation/Legislation?Chamber=S&LegType=B&LegNo=668&year=19
[https://perma.cc/6WLP-SQPJ ] (follow “Actions” link at left).
112. See id.; see also Interview with Daymon Ely, supra note 93.
113. 2019 Regular Session – SB 688, supra note 113.
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G. The Ethics Commission
The State Ethics Commission Act defines the powers and many procedures
of the Commission.114 The primary roles of the Commission are to investigate and
adjudicate complaints, issue advisory opinions, and provide training to state
employees.115 The complaint process begins by intaking complaints.116 In response
to concerns about bad-faith complaints, complainants must attest to the truth of their
allegations in the presence of a notary public and submit their complaint under
penalty of perjury.117 This represents a compromise between the House’s preference
for an open door to complaints and the Senate’s provisions criminalizing leakers.118
Under this version, complainants can still go public if they want to but there are
protections in place to disincentivize complaints made in bad faith.
Complaints are limited in two other ways. A statute of limitations is
imposed. Complaints must be made within two years from the time when the alleged
conduct occurred or could have reasonably been discovered.119 Second, a blackout
period is observed. The Commission will not adjudicate complaints made against a
candidate within 60 days of a primary or general election.120
Once a complaint is received, the Commission’s Executive Director will
decide if the complaint is within its jurisdiction.121 Surviving that barrier, a complaint
goes to the general counsel to conduct a preliminary investigation.122 If the counsel
determines the complaint is unsubstantiated, it will be dismissed, and it will not be
made public.123 But if the general counsel finds probable cause, the complaint will
continue, and it will be made public within 30 days.124 After the bill was passed,
Senate Majority leader Peter Wirth said the “initiative strikes the right balance
between public transparency and due process for the accused.”125
The general counsel has the right to administer oaths, interview witnesses,
and examine records.126 If a subpoena becomes necessary, the counsel may
communicate such to the director, who can request that the full commission petition
a district court judge to issue such a subpoena.127 If a subpoena requires enforcement,
the same process is followed to request the district court issue an order.128
114. 2019 N.M. Laws, ch. 86, §§ 1–42 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-16G-1 to 16 (1978)).
115. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16G-5 (1978).
116. Id. § 10-16G-10.
117. Id.§ 10-16G-10(B).
118. See supra note 96.
119. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16G-15(A) (1978).
120. Id. § 10-16G-15(B).
121. § 10-16G-10(D).
122. § 10-16G-10(E).
123. Id.
124. § 10-16G-10(G).
125. New Mexico Forges Ahead with Independent Ethic Commission, AP (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://apnews.com/28c002c81dc94d969ae828d8d469608d [https://perma.cc/4P77-FC4E].
126. § 10-16G-10(I).
127. Id.
128. § 10-16G-10 (J). Of note, the Commission will have a specific district court judge assigned to it
for two-year terms by the Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court. Id.

Winter 2021

NEW MEXICO'S INDEPENDENT ETHICS COMMISSION

289

If the general counsel’s investigation suggests there was an ethical
violation, a hearing officer will adjudicate the complaint.129 The complainant may
settle the complaint without a finding, or the hearing officer will make a
determination using a preponderance of the evidence standard.130 Complainants or
subjects of complaints may appeal a ruling to the full seven-member Commission.131
The Commission may refer criminal issues to the Attorney General, refer other issues
back to an executive agency or legislative council for enforcement, file for civil
enforcement in court, or issue fines for civil violations of several state laws.132
The Ethics Commission Act made few changes to substantive anticorruption law, and where it did the purpose was to centralize processes in the
Commission rather than across executive agencies. The commission has jurisdiction
to enforce a discrete group of laws which formerly rested with the Attorney General:
the Campaign Reporting Act, Financial Disclosure Act, Gift Act, Lobbyist
Regulation Act, Voter Action Act, Governmental Conduct Act, Procurement Code,
the Ethics Commission Act, and article IX, section 14 of the New Mexico
Constitution.133 Other substantive changes include an amendment to the
Governmental Conduct Act which removes from the Secretary of State and gives to
the commission responsibility for receiving agency codes of conduct, for designing
legislators’ ethics training, and for advising and educating government employees
about ethical requirements.134
While the creation of the Ethics Commission is worthwhile, there are
remaining steps to take if the commission is to succeed. The Commission as currently
structured evinces critical gaps in enforcement power that must be fixed, and gaps in
the underlying anti-corruption law that must also be filled.
ANALYSIS
II.

NEW MEXICO MUST STRENGTHEN THE ETHICS
COMMISSION

The Ethics Commission, as currently empowered in the enabling
legislation, risks failing to meet its mandate. If the purpose of the Commission is to
discourage public corruption and build public trust in government, then the
Commission’s strength and the public’s perception of its independence are both
paramount. Observers consider the following factors when evaluating the strength
and independence of ethics commissions: jurisdiction, budget and staffing,
transparency, legal structure, and commissioner selection and removal.135 This
129. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16G-12(A)(2) (1978).
130. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-16G-10(F), 10-16G-12(D) (1978).
131. § 10-16G-12(E).
132. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-16G-9, 10-16G-12(D), 10-16G-14 (1978)
133. § 10-16G-9.
134. 2019 N.M. Laws, ch. 86, §§ 23–24; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-16-11, 13.1 (Effective January 1,
2020) (1978).
135. See, e.g., Principles of an Effective Ethics Commission, N. M. ETHICS WATCH,
http://nmethicswatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/NMEW-Principles-of-An-Effective-EthicsComission.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JZ8-2WLV]; CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR, PRINCIPLES FOR DESIGNING AN
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section acknowledges the Commission’s legal foundations and transparency as
strengths, but critiques other significant weaknesses in the current Ethics
Commission Act and makes recommendations for addressing them.
A.

Legal Foundation

New Mexico’s Commission, by virtue of being created constitutionally
rather than statutorily, begins on solid legal footing. The constitutional amendment
solves separation of powers concerns that can arise when an ethics commission is
created within one branch of government but attempts to provide oversite for other
branches.136 In this way, the Ethics Commission will not be vulnerable to legal
challenges that could undermine its ability to operate. In addition, by being outside
of any one branch of state government, the Ethics Commission is assured a certain
amount of independence. It will never be tasked with investigating a public official
who has oversight or control over it in any organizational chart.137
B.

Public Disclosure and Transparency

Public trust and public knowledge of ethics violations are paramount for the
effectiveness of an ethics commission. The New Mexico Ethics Commission is
required to make complaints public within thirty days after a finding of probable
cause and all hearings must be open to the public.138 This is a significant
improvement from earlier drafts of the bill in which no public disclosure was
required.139 In fact, it requires public disclosure earlier in the process than many other
states. Florida’s ethics law, upheld as an exemplar of transparency by organizations
like the Campaign Legal Center,140 requires public reporting of the results of an
investigation only after an investigation has been completed.141 The legislature
should guard against any future attempts to diminish the transparency of the Ethics
Commission.

INDEPENDENT ETHICS COMMISSIONhttps://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/Principles%20
for%20Designing%20an%20Independent%20Ethics%20Commission.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MWASPYG].
136. See, e.g., McSherry, supra note 4, at 602, 618–627 (discussing a failed bill to create a statutory
ethics commission in 2007 and potential constitutional problems of a legislatively-empowered
commission investigating other branches).
137. See, e.g., Marianne Goodland, COVER STORY: Colorado’s Independent Ethics Commission on
Uncertain Course, GAZETTE (June 21, 2020), https://gazette.com/news/cover-story-colorado-sindependent-ethics-commission-on-uncertain-course/article_8132b6ac-b06c-11e8-9c01b338b2bab7ad.html [https://perma.cc/FAF6-XDHW] (discussing Colorado moving its commission from
the executive branch to the judicial branch to protect its independence).
138. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-16G-10(G), 10-16G-12(A)(2) (1978).
139. See S.B. 619, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019), https://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/19%20Regular
/bills/senate/SB0619.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M5G-7FQ2].
140. See CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, supra note 138.
141. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.322(2)(b) (West 2020).
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The Ethics Commission’s Limited Jurisdiction

Though the Ethics Commission is often sold as a panacea for government
corruption, it is a body with surprisingly limited jurisdiction. It has subject matter
jurisdiction over the civil enforcement of a discrete set of enumerated laws,142 and it
asserts personal jurisdiction over a specific sub-group of public officials: state
executive branch officials, state legislative and state-wide elected officials or
candidates, government contractors, lobbyists and lobbyists’ employers.143 The
statute of limitations is relatively short—two years from the date of the alleged
conduct.144 Jurisdiction is limited in time in one other way; complaints may not be
considered against a candidate within 60 days of an election.145
It is worth noting that the Ethics Commission does not have jurisdiction
over criminal matters, though the Commission can refer complaints containing
criminal allegations to the Attorney General or a district attorney.146 This
jurisdictional limitation is appropriate, but given that most of the cases of corruption
that have been discussed in this comment, for example, are criminal issues, this
limitation reveals that the Commission has less authority than the general public
might expect, which has the potential to undermine public confidence in the
commission.
Many potential corrupt actors or actions lay outside the bounds of the given
jurisdiction. The largest gap in Commission jurisdiction is that it covers only statelevel employees or elected officials. Local government, school districts, charter
schools, and state-level commissions were exempted from Commission oversight
completely.147 Any county commissioner, city councilor, mayor, school board
member, district superintendent, or acequia mayordomo148 accused of wrongdoing
is spared a public and independent investigation by the Ethics Commission.149
There are many forms of corrupt behavior that fall outside the bounds of the
enumerated bills. The Commission does not have discretion to address forms of legal

142. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16G-9 (1978) (allowing jurisdiction over “(1) the Campaign Reporting
Act; (2) the Financial Disclosure Act [Chapter 10, Article 16A NMSA 1978]; (3) the Gift Act [10-16B-1
to 10-16B-4 NMSA 1978]; (4) the Lobbyist Regulation Act [Chapter 2, Article 11 NMSA 1978]; (5) the
Voter Action Act [1-19A-1 to 1-19A-17 NMSA 1978]; (6) the Governmental Conduct Act [Chapter 10,
Article 16 NMSA 1978]; (7) the Procurement Code [13-1-28 to 13-1-199 NMSA 1978]; (8) the State
Ethics Commission Act ; and (9) Article 9, Section 14 of the constitution of New Mexico.”)
143. Id.
144. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16G-15 (1978).
145. Id.
146. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16G-14 (1978).
147. See N.M. CONST. art. V, § 17; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16G-1 to -18. (1978).
148. Acequia associations manage common waterways in New Mexico, and must by law appoint
commissioners and a mayordomo, or superintendent, for the management thereof. See N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 73-2-1 to -68 (1978).
149. They may, however, still face prosecution for criminal violations of anti-corruption law. See
supra note 149 and accompanying text. In addition, at least the City of Albuquerque has established an
Inspector General’s Office meant to investigate fraud, abuse, mismanagement, and waste in city
government. See Inspector General, CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, https://www.cabq.gov/inspectorgeneral
[https://perma.cc/8F83-6BBX].
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corruption which arise in state government.150 But more to the point, certain anticorruption bills are not within the scope of the Ethics Commission, like the Open
Meetings Act or Inspection of Public Records Act, for example.151 The power to
investigate alleged violations of the Campaign Reporting Act were, unlike other
laws, not given exclusively to the Ethics Commission. Instead, the Commission and
Secretary of State are required to share jurisdiction.152
Also outside of Ethics Commission domain are the codes of ethics for the
legislature and executive agencies unless or until the Commission is able to negotiate
memoranda of understanding for shared jurisdiction with those bodies.153 In the
meantime, the legislature still gets to write its own ethics rules and investigate
alleged violations of those rules by its own members without interference from the
independent ethics commission. In practice, this would mean that the existence of
the new Ethics Commission would not change the process regarding a complaint like
the one brought against Representative Carl Trujillo in the run-up to the 2018
election. Trujillo was accused of sexually harassing a lobbyist and was investigated
by his peers on the Legislative Ethics Committee, where his accuser refused to
submit to questioning.154 Even if the accuser had agreed to submit for questioning
before the Committee, and had the Committee found reason to pursue a reprimand
for Trujillo, the recommendation would still have had to go before the full seventymember house for a vote.155 While the investigation was open, Trujillo lost his seat
in a primary election, and the issue became moot—leaving both accuser and accused
with plenty of reason for frustration with the process.156 That process remains
unchanged despite the passage of the new State Ethics Commission. Because the
accusation against Trujillo violated the legislature’s anti-harassment policy but not
any existing anti-corruption law over which the Commission has authority, the
complaint would have still been adjudicated by Trujillo’s peers in the Legislative
Ethics Committee and House of Representatives. All of this is to say that in New
Mexico, a large body of ethics rules will still be written by state agencies or the
legislature and complaints made pursuant to those rules will still be handled
internally rather than by the independent Commission.

150. See supra section I, part A; infra section III, parts A and C.
151. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
152. 2019 N.M. Laws, ch. 86, § 19; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-34.8 (1978)
153. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16G-9(E) (1978)).
154. Andrew Oxford, Legislative Panel Scraps Harassment Case Against Rep. Trujillo, SANTA FE
NEW MEXICAN (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/legislativepanel-scraps-harassment-case-against-rep-trujillo/article_2c88edfe-a74b-5dcc-be18-085f8cc5a64a.html
[https://perma.cc/V26G-9RLL].
155. Dan McKay & Dan Boyd, Investigators Move Sexual Harassment Case Against Legislator
Forward, ALBUQUERQUE J. (July 28, 2018, 11:18 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com
/1202149/investigation-finds-probable-cause-in-case-against-rep-trujillo.html
[https://perma.cc/S565W7EY].
156. Id.
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Recommendation
The legislature should expand the scope of the Ethics Commission to cover
local government, school boards, and state-wide commissions. Doing so would
expand the number of potential victims and whistleblowers able to appeal to the
Commission and would expand the Commission’s deterrent effects down to the
levels of government closest to the citizenry. The legislature should also give the
Ethics Commission the authority to write codes of ethics and enforce them for all
government entities, including the legislature itself. By doing this, all violations of
ethics would be investigated and adjudicated by the independent body and not by a
legislator’s own peers in the Legislative Ethics Commission. Both changes could be
accomplished through an amendment to the Ethics Commission Act.
In giving the Commission the ability to write and enforce codes of ethics,
New Mexico would not be unique. Oklahoma’s ethics commission not only has
jurisdiction over violations of governmental codes of ethics, but it writes the codes
of ethics itself.157 While the legislature has demonstrated a reluctance to abdicate
power over its own ethics rules, its hesitation is misplaced. A fear of politicizing the
complaint process should lead, logically, to desiring investigations and findings by
an independent body.
D.

Subpoena Power, Interrupted

After tough debate between a House version with full subpoena power and
a Senate version without any subpoena power, the final Ethics Commission Act
contained a compromise allowing the Commission indirect subpoena power.158 The
Commission must petition a district court judge assigned to it by the Supreme Court
to issue a subpoena on its behalf.159 While this compromise gives the Commission
much more power than if it had no subpoena authority at all, it adds an extra step and
another layer of potential conflict of interest to Commission investigations. Imagine
the conflicts, real and perceived, if the assigned judge knew the legislator or state
employee who is the subject of a complaint. The extra step also provides more
opportunity for inefficiency or obstruction. If a judge decided to be antagonistic to
the Commission and not approve subpoenas, there would be a significant wrench in
the system. The extra layer of permission, which may very well pose no problem
much of the time, has the potential to create a significant barrier to the Commission’s
functional independence. Even when working well, the extra step has the potential
to add to a public perception that the Commission lacks independence.
Recommendation
The obvious solution is to empower the Commission with direct subpoena
power. Oklahoma’s commission, for example, includes in the state constitution that
the commission may issue subpoenas independently.160 New Mexico’s constitution
157.
158.
159.
160.

OKLA. CONST. art. XXIX, § 3.
See supra notes 99, 124–130 and accompanying text.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16G-5(C)(2) (1978).
OKLA. CONST. art. XXIX, § 4(C).

294

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 51; No. 1

creates space for the Ethics Commission to have its own subpoena power, leaving
the nature of the power up the legislature.161 An amendment to the Ethics
Commission Act, therefore, could give the Commission full independence to conduct
its own investigations without a judicial branch gatekeeper. The Legislature should
amend the Ethics Commission Act to give the Ethics Commission full, independent,
and direct subpoena power.
E.

The Lack of Recurring Funding

Conspicuously absent from both the constitutional amendment and the
enabling legislation is any reference to funding for the Commission. The
Commission is required to reimburse members for travel and to have at minimum an
Executive Director and General Counsel on staff.162 It will also require office space,
a meeting location, basic office equipment an internet presence, and a docketing
system at the very least. All of these things are necessary for it to function, and
ostensibly require funding. For its first year, the Commission received a $500,000.00
appropriation.163 This is less than the $1,000,000 recommended by civic
organizations.164 And a single-year appropriation does not guarantee future funding.
Even if the legislature feels public pressure to keep the Ethics Commission
funded now, the Commission loses its independence without guaranteed recurring
funding. It will always be forced to advocate for its funding and to hope that the
complicated politics of the legislative budget and gubernatorial veto processes result
in the full funding requested. Although it is hard to imagine a politician being willing
to be publicly against the Ethics Commission, it is entirely possible for a frustrated
legislator or governor to hold up funding for the Commission. This gives both the
legislative and executive branches opportunities to coerce, manipulate, or punish the
Commission—and the ability to shut it down entirely by defunding it. In practical
terms, this is a direct threat to the Commission’s ability to investigate and hold
government officials accountable independently and without fear of reprisal.
Recommendation
New Mexico should ensure the Commission has recurring funding in law.
The strongest way of accomplishing this would be to mimic Oklahoma, which in its
state constitution compels the state legislature to annually appropriate funding
“sufficient to enable it to perform its duties.”.165 Short of going through the more
challenging constitutional amendment process, the legislature could provide for
recurring funding statutorily in an amendment to the Ethics Commission Act. In this

161. N.M. CONST. art. V, § 17(C) (“The state ethics commission may require the attendance of
witnesses or the production of records and other evidence relevant to an investigation by subpoena as
provided by law”) (emphasis added).
162. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-16G-3(G), 10-16G-6.
163. General Appropriation Act, H.B. 2, 54th Leg., 1st Sess., Sec. 5, § 39 at 179 (N.M. 2019),
https://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/19%20Regular/final/HB0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/N73Y-6PA2].
164. See, e.g., N. M. ETHICS WATCH, supra note 5.
165. OKLA. CONST. art. XXIX, § 2.
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way, the Commission would be assured of a minimum level of funding and could
operate independently and effectively.
III.
AN ETHICS COMMISSION IS NOT A PANACEA AND THE NEW
MEXICO LEGISLATURE SHOULD CONTINUE TO FILL GAPS IN ANTICORRUPTION LAWS
The Ethics Commission, a supposed answer to the problem of government
corruption, makes few changes to substantive anti-corruption law in New Mexico.
The Commission is tasked with enforcing the laws as they exist, and as such is
limited in its scope and force by those laws. For the Commission to meet its broad
mandate, the legislature must not only strengthen the Commission directly, but must
also address gaps in anti-corruption law broadly. While the purpose of this comment
is not to give a comprehensive survey of all anti-corruption law in New Mexico, this
section will exemplify the problems of unaddressed gaps by recommending changes
to three areas of law and legislative procedure where corruption seeps into the system
legally and beyond the reach of the new Commission: the unpaid legislature, income
disclosure, and the capital outlay process.
A.

Professionalize the Legislature

New Mexico’s so-called “citizen-legislature,” is rife with legal corruption.
Because the state constitution prohibits state legislators from receiving a salary, New
Mexico’s legislators often have jobs on the side—if they are not retired or
independently wealthy.166 In contrast to full-time, salaried legislators elsewhere,
New Mexico’s lawmakers cannot approach policy decisions only being concerned
about the public good, but are forced to consider how each vote might impact their
livelihood. When legislation about the insurance industry is being considered, for
example, legislators who work in insurance are incentivized to act in their own selfinterest to protect the industry.167 This type of corruption is inherent in a citizen
legislature, and lawmakers vote on bills affecting their day jobs entirely legally.
Nothing about the creation of an independent ethics agency changes that fact. The
citizen legislature serves as an example of the simple, common, and legal ways
public decisions can be made in the private interest, undermining government
effectiveness and public trust.
Recommendation
The direct solution to this problem is to professionalize the legislature by
paying lawmakers a salary sufficient to live on. Eliminating legislators’ need for a
separate source of income would relieve policymaking of many conflicts of interest.
This solution is easier identified than implemented. Because the citizen legislature is
a constitutional creation, it requires a constitutional fix. Moreover voters in the past

166. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
167. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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have shown little interest in allowing legislators a salary.168 The concern of this
comment, however, is not the politically possible, but the legally preferable. To meet
the goal of reducing public corruption and conflicts of interests, paying legislators is
a necessary step.
B.

Strengthen Income Disclosure Laws

As long as legislators do maintain personal careers, the public has an
interest in transparently knowing how those legislators make money.169 The
Financial Disclosures Act (“the Act”), however, permits legislators to keep details
of their finances in the dark.170 The Act only requires disclosure of “general category
descriptions” of sources of income above $5,000.171 In practice, legislators are able
to list vague, non-specific sources of income. For example, a legislator who is a
practicing attorney could list “General Civil Law Practice” without the public ever
knowing whose interests that attorney is paid to represent.172 Legislators are also free
to avoid disclosing the specific amount of income generated from a source.173 The
public is left to guess whether or not the legislator’s income or business interest is
worth thousands of dollars or millions—surely a meaningful distinction when the
legislator is considering laws that may affect those interests. Finally, financial
interests from out of state are generally not vulnerable to disclosure.174
It is possible for legislators to fill out an annual disclosure form which
reveals very little about potential conflicts of interest. The public deserves to know
what private interests a legislator has by knowing for whom and with whom they are
doing business—and the extent to which those interests relate to bills that legislators
write, support, and vote on.
Recommendation
The legislature should amend the Financial Disclosure Act to require
greater transparency. The Ethics Commission, in its new capacity, could
immediately issue advisory opinions defining the types of actions which represent
conflicts of interests and could advocate for strengthening of reporting laws. Specific
168. Constitutional amendments allowing for a paid legislature have been voted down by the general
public in 1961, 1965, 1969, 1974, 1978, 1990, and 1992. See N.M. Compilation Comm’n, Constitution of
New Mexico Sec. 10 [Compensation of Members], Annotations, NMONESOURCE
https://laws.nmonesource.com/w/nmos/const-nm#!b/aIVs10 [https://perma.cc/BFE8-66SZ ].
169. See generally Justin Horwath, Inaccurate Financial Disclosures Leave Voters in Dark, SANTA
FE NEW MEXICAN (Sept. 24, 2016), https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/inaccuratefinancial-disclosures-leave-voters-in-dark/article_9f40569a-a084-578b-80a5-51e24717608b.html
[https://perma.cc/62TV-MWQC].
170. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16A-1 to -8 (1978).
171. Id. § 10-16A-3(D)(2).
172. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Sabo, Public Deserves More Info on Financial Forms, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
(Nov. 10, 2019, 12:05 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1389714/public-deserves-more-info-onfinancial-forms.html [https://perma.cc/HBJ7-7TBH].
173. SeeDOUGLAS CARVAR & LUCY RIVER, N.M. ETHICS WATCH, LEARNING TO WALK: NEW
MEXICO’S ANEMIC FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REGIME
5,
http://nmethicswatch.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/NMEW_FinancialDisclosures_WalkingBeforeRunning_WEB5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5K4A-M3FQ].
174. Id.
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changes should include (1) requiring “the reporting of names, addresses, and
employers of the” legislator plus their spouse/domestic partner, “children, children’s
spouses, and household members”; (2) requiring “that the relationship between coowners of real estate be revealed”; (3) requiring “specificity when reporting income
sources so that it is clear that sources reported throughout the form are captured in
the income source reporting”; and (4) “requiring reporting of tiers of economic
interest . . . so that it is clear how significant a reported financial interest is.”175 Even
if legislators were paid, these disclosure requirements should still be operative and
would be worthwhile for revealing lawmakers’ personal financial interests.
C.

Shine Sunlight on Capital Outlay Procedures

New Mexico’s public infrastructure funding process is non-transparent and
political, giving legislators a simple way to engage in legal corruption and quid pro
quo. Public infrastructure spending, or capital outlay spending, is the process by
which the state funds public works—roads, bridges, dams, courthouses or
community centers.176 In 2019, the legislature appropriated over $900 million in
capital outlay.177
The problem is that the process is anonymous and political. Every year, the
pot of money allocated for capital outlay is divvied up between 112 legislators and
the governor.178 Each individual legislator then confidentially requests local projects
for funding and those recommendations are rolled up into a single appropriations
bill, with each project’s requestor remaining secret.179 New Mexico is the last state
in the country that allows individual legislators to earmark funds for their districts.180
Without objective criteria for selection, or transparency about who is
selecting which projects, it is impossible to know why state money is being doled
out to its recipients—making it possible for legislators to wield the power of the
purse for corrupt ends.181 An individual legislator can easily direct funding not based
175. SABO & AREVALO, supra note 67, at 386.
176. See ,e.g., Jens Gould, Many Seek Capital Outlay, But Process Opaque, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN
(Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/legislature/many-seek-capital-outlay-butprocess-opaque/article_b16c0d00-4486-11ea-a3a6-3fcd84de9521.html [https://perma.cc/TLG3-5BVL].
177. Marjorie Childress, NM Doles out Billion Dollars in Capital Outlay, Funding Decisions Remain
Secret, N. M. IN DEPTH (Mar. 11, 2019), http://nmindepth.com/2019/03/11/nm-doles-billion-dollars-forcapital-outlay-funding-decisions-remain-secret/ https://perma.cc/4KD6-XAJZ.
178. See FRED NATHAN & KRISTINA G. FISHER, THINK N.M., THE STORY OF THE CHRISTMAS TREE
BILL: FIXING PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING IN NEW MEXICO 13 (2015)
http://www.thinknewmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/CapitalOutlayReportWeb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4FXJ-35H6].
179. See, e.g., id. at 15; Childress, supra note 191; Steve Terrell, Outlook Uncertain for Reform of
NEWS
(Feb.
5,
2016),
State’s
Ridiculed
Capital
Outlay
Process,
TAOS
https://taosnews.com/stories/outlook-uncertain-for-reform-of-states-ridiculed-capital-outlayprocess,26954 [https://perma.cc/5FF6-MLR9].
180. Sandra Fish, Analysis: Weaknesses Mar NM’s Capital Outlay System, N. M. IN DEPTH (Aug. 15,
2015), http://nmindepth.com/2015/08/15/analysis-weaknesses-mar-nms-capital-outlay-system/ [https://
perma.cc/P79L-H2QY].
181. See, e.g., NATHAN & FISHER, supra note 192, at 13. (“Michael Pagano, a professor in the
Department of Public Administration at the University of Illinois and a national expert on state capital
budgeting said that New Mexico’s annual Christmas Tree Bill ‘would be the illustration about how not to
do capital improvement planning.’”).
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on the public good, but as a tool for rewarding political supporters, coercing nonsupporters, or enriching self and friends.182 Indeed, without transparency, it is nearly
impossible for the public to know whether or not that is happening.
Because this type of corruption is entirely legal, the new Ethics Commission
will not have any authority to address it. If the goal is to reduce public corruption in
New Mexico government, addressing the capital outlay disbursement processes is
critical.
Recommendation
There are any number of solutions to this problem. A direct one for reducing
opportunities for corruption is to make the current system transparent. Ensuring the
public knows who is recommending which projects and why would, at the very least,
allow journalists and other watchdogs to follow the money. The more comprehensive
solution would be to make the process entirely non-political by removing capital
outlay from the legislature and giving it to a commission focused on long-term
planning and objective prioritization, as nineteen other states have done.183 In this
way, the public interest would be elevated and legislators’ opportunities to use the
funds personally would be eliminated. Finally, the Ethics Commission’s jurisdiction
could be expanded to include overseeing public infrastructure projects, as is the case
with New York’s Inspector General.184
These three holes in anti-corruption law—the unpaid legislature, the weak
income disclosure, and the secret capital outlay—are not a comprehensive
description of gaps in the law, but they are representative of the problem. The Ethics
Commission can only enforce the law to the extent that it exists. In order to support
the Commission’s success, the legislature should continue to push urgently to repair
breaches in laws and legislative procedures that allow legal corruption to continue.
CONCLUSION
This Comment began by describing a string of high-profile corruption
scandals in New Mexico in recent years. The New Mexico legislature, as a solution,
created the State Ethics Commission to curb illegal corruption. The reduction of
public corruption is a worthy goal, and an independent ethics agency could very well
be a contributing part of the effort. But for the Ethics Commission to succeed, it must
be strengthened, and gaps in the underlying anti-corruption law it is meant to enforce
must be filled. Without a continued effort to build strong constraints and create
powerful disincentives to public corruption, the Ethics Commission is set up to fall
short of expectations. New Mexico citizens backed the Ethics Commission with a

182. See, e.g., supra notes. 86–87and accompanying text (discussing a Senate Pro Tem directing extra
capital outlay money to a building project which he pocketed).
supra
note
192,
at
19.
content/uploads/pdfs/
183. See
NATHAN & FISHER,
CapitalOutlayReportWeb.pdf (describing the independent commissions in Oklahoma and Utah and listing
the models of 20 states with independent commissions).
184. About The Office, N. Y. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., https://ig.ny.gov/offices/inspectorgeneral
[https://perma.cc/K8DX-4CPB]
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landslide vote. But a flailing or failing Commission, created in part to build public
trust in government, risks having the opposite effect, disappointing and disillusioning
the public which supported it.

